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Countering DDoS Attacks 
with Multi-Path Overlay 
Networks
by Angelos Stavrou and Angelos Keromytis
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) has emerged as a major threat to 
the operation of online network services 
[1, 2, 3]. Current forms of DDoS attacks 
implicate multiple groups of Internet 
machines that have been taken over 
and controlled by an attacker. These 
machines, called bots, are manipulated 
by the attacker to produce an excessive 
surge of trafﬁ c toward a target server, 
the victim. The target server is forced to 
processing and/or to link-capacity starva-
tion, since malicious trafﬁ c is blended 
with normal trafﬁ c, making it difﬁ cult to 
weed out. Figure 1 depicts a DDoS attack 
and its impact on the target server. 
Unfortunately, DDoS attacks can 
only become worse: Despite network and 
processing speeds that increase with every 
passing day, real-world botnet sizes and 
attack capabilities increase at the same 
rate. Furthermore, attackers devise sophis-
ticated software to infect and subsequently 
control thousands of infected machines 
while remaining stealthy. [4] 
Addressing the network (DDoS) 
problem is extremely hard, given the 
fundamentally open nature of the Internet 
and the apparent reluctance of router 
vendors and network operators to deploy 
and operate new, potentially complex 
mechanisms. [5] Overlay-based approaches 
such as Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [6], 
funded by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) and the National 
Science Foundation (NSF Grant ITR CNS-
04-26623); I3 [7]; and MayDay (Distributed 
Filtering for Internet Services) [8] offer 
an attractive alternative, as they do not 
require changes to the existing routing 
infrastructure. Furthermore, such systems 
require minimal or no collaboration from 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), making 
their deployment completely transparent 
and thus practical. Overlay-based protec-
tion systems use an Internet-wide network 
of nodes that act as ﬁ rst-level ﬁ rewalls, 
discriminating between legitimate trafﬁ c 
and potentially malicious trafﬁ c, enforcing 
some form of user or end-host authentica-
tion. Their distributed nature requires an 
extremely well-provisioned adversary to 
suppress their functionality, because, to 
disrupt protected communications, attack 
trafﬁ c must be split among all nodes. But 
how do these systems operate in practice?
Protection via Indirection 
Overlay Networks
In Figure 2, we present the main charac-
teristics of the original SOS architecture, 
which is representative of indirection via
overlay-based protection systems. We 
distinguish the three parts of the system: 
Figure 1  The target server is the victim of a DDoS attack. Legitimate users are denied access to the actual service 
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the users, the overlay, and the protected 
server. Users want to establish a connec-
tion with the protected server but cannot 
do so directly—only a few select overlay 
nodes are allowed to communicate 
through the router-ﬁ ltered area. These 
nodes can change over time in a random 
manner (but in coordination with the 
ﬁ ltering routers). Although all overlay 
nodes are assumed to be publicly known, 
the precise identity of those nodes that can 
forward trafﬁ c through the ﬁ ltered region 
at any given point in time is kept secret.
Users have to ﬁ rst authenticate 
themselves to the overlay network by 
connecting to a publicly advertised 
overlay node. This authentication can be 
either via cryptographic protocol and/or 
reverse Graphic Turing Tests (GTTs) [9] to 
determine valid users. (In some scenarios, 
this may simply mean “humans,” while 
in other cases, some form of “proper” 
authentication may be required). Trafﬁ c 
from legitimate users is routed via the 
overlay and through the allowed overlay 
nodes to the protected service. However, 
malicious (or simply unknown) trafﬁ c 
is simply dropped by the overlay nodes, 
keeping the DDoS attack far from the 
protected service and potentially close to 
the attacker, using the overlay network as 
an indirection mechanism. One assump-
tion made by systems such as SOS is 
that there is enough capacity leading to 
the ﬁ ltering router to withstand a direct 
DDoS attack (i.e., the unprotected links 
cannot be saturated). In most instances 
of DDoS attacks to date, the upstream ISP 
can handle the additional trafﬁ c; it is the 
target’s uplink that is typically less well 
provisioned. By allowing only a few, select 
overlay nodes to forward trafﬁ c through 
this router, we avoid the need for new 
(potentially expensive, computationally 
or otherwise) router features.
Unfortunately, the original 
approaches of the Indirection-based 
Overlay Network (ION) depend on the 
inability of an adversary to discover 
connectivity information for a given 
client and the infrastructure (e.g., which 
overlay node a client is using to route 
trafﬁ c). This makes them susceptible to 
a variety of easy-to-launch attacks that 
are not considered in the standard threat 
model of such systems. For example, 
adversaries may possess real-time 
knowledge of the speciﬁ c overlay 
node(s) through which a client is routing 
trafﬁ c or may be attacking nodes using 
a time-based scheme that will try to 
maximize the impact of the attack on a 
client’s connectivity. Such attacks can be 
network-oriented such as Transmission 
Figure 2  An overlay-based protection system. The users connect through the overlay nodes to the protected server. 
The overlay nodes act as distributed ﬁ lters deep inside the network, mitigating the effects of a DDoS attack by dropping 
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Control Protocol Synchronize (TCP SYN) 
attacks, application-related “sweeping” 
attacks, or “targeted” attacks.
In targeted attacks, an attacker who 
has knowledge of a client’s communica-
tion parameters can “follow” the client’s 
connections and bring down the nodes 
that he tries to connect to. As soon as 
the client realizes (typically, after some 
time-out period) that the overlay node 
is unresponsive and switches to a new 
node, the attacker also switches the 
attack to this new node. Thus an attacker 
that can bring down a single node can 
succeed in a targeted DDoS attack for 
speciﬁ c clients. Similar attacks, exploiting 
information that must only be available 
to trusted components of the system but 
which an attacker can feasibly gain access 
to, are possible against almost all previ-
ously proposed anti-DDoS mechanisms.
Furthermore, IO networks are 
susceptible to an even worse type of 
attack: the sweeping attack. For this, an 
attacker uses its power (which is insuf-
ﬁ cient to bring down an entire ION) to 
target a small percentage of the overlay 
nodes at a time. The weak point of the 
overlay network is the application-level 
state maintained by the overlay node that 
is responsible for a client. Destroying this 
state forces the client to re-establish both 
network and application-level connec-
tivity, degrading the clients’ connection 
and leading to DDoS for time-critical 
or latency-dependent applications. 
Repeating this attack can force clients 
to re-establish their credentials multiple 
times within short periods of time, 
making IONs completely impractical. 
Thus, although IONs can counter blind 
DoS attacks, they remain vulnerable to a 
range of simple but debilitating attacks.
A Novel, Stateless Architecture
We believe that these inherent limita-
tions of ﬁ rst-generation, overlay-based, 
trafﬁ c-redirection mechanisms can be 
addressed by adopting a spread-spec-
trum-like communication paradigm. 
Note that although we use the term 
“spread-spectrum” to describe our 
approach, our work is not geared toward 
wireless networks nor does it touch on 
physical-layer issues. Our approach, as 
shown in Figure 3, is straightforward: 
Spread the packets from the client across 
all overlay nodes in a random manner, 
storing no network- or application-level 
state in the overlay nodes. The path diver-
sity naturally exhibited by a distributed 
overlay network serves as the “spectrum” 
over which communications are “spread.” 
In our system, a token issued by the 
overlay network to the client is used to 
verify the authenticity of each packet 
communicated by the client. The use of a 
token (akin to a Kerberos ticket) alleviates 
the necessity to maintain application- or 
network-level state at any overlay node 
(unlike previous IONs) at the expense 
of bandwidth (since the ticket must be 
included in every packet routed through 
the ION). In return, our system is imper-
vious to attacks that use this state depen-
dence to attack the overlay.
An attacker will not know which 
nodes to direct an attack to; randomly 
attacking a subset of them will only 
cause a fraction of the client’s trafﬁ c 
to be dropped. By using Forward Error 
Correction (FEC) or simply duplicating 
packets (i.e., simultaneously sending the 
same packet through two or more different 
overlay nodes), we can guarantee packet 
delivery with high probability, if we place 
an upper bound on the number of nodes 
an attacker can simultaneously attack. 
Attack Resilience and Performance
To evaluate our system, we used a testbed 
consisting of PlanetLab Consortium 
machines located at various sites in 
the continental US. These machines 
were running User Mode Linux (UML) 
on commodity x86 hardware (Intel 
and compatible computer processors) 
and were connected using the Abilene 
Network Internet-2 high-performance 
backbone. Using these fairly distributed 
machines, we constructed our overlay 
network of overlay nodes by running a 
small forwarding daemon on each of the 
participating machines. We also used 
two more machines, acting as client and 
server, respectively. In our experiments, 
we measured link characteristics such as 
end-to-end latency and throughput when 
we interposed the overlay network of 
overlay nodes between the client and the 
protected server. To measure throughput, 
we used a protected server that was 
located at Columbia University in the City 
of New York. For our latency measure-
ments, we used http://www.cnn.com as 
the “target.” In both cases, the goal of the 
Figure 3  Users spread their packets to the network using a pseudo-random generator to avoid creating state to 
a single indirection node. An attacker cannot succeed by focusing his attack to some of the indirection nodes. Our 
system can sustain attacks that bring down up to 40% of indirection nodes, making it suitable for applications that 
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client was to establish communication 
with the protected server. To do so, the 
client used User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
encapsulation on the TCP packets gener-
ated by a Secure Copy (SCP) session and 
then spread the UDP packets to the nodes 
participating on the overlay network. 
Those packets were in turn forwarded 
to a pre-speciﬁ ed overlay node that was 
permitted to connect to the protected 
server. Since our throughput connection 
measurements involve a client and a 
server that were co-located, we effectively 
measured the worst-case scenario (since 
our otherwise-local trafﬁ c had to take a 
tour of the Internet). A non-co-located 
server would result in a higher latency and 
lower throughput for a direct client-server 
connection, leading to comparatively 
better results when we use the overlay. 
Surprisingly, in some cases, we can achieve 
better latency using the overlay rather than 
by connecting directly to the server.
Through our experiments and 
theoretical analysis, we show that, for an 
attacker to successfully attack our system, 
he will have to subvert or suppress more 
than 40% of the overlay nodes before the 
system becomes unusable for all users. 
Of course, our ability to thwart attacks 
depends on the packet replication (redun-
dancy) we use. For example, a packet 
replication of 100% means that the client 
will replicate all packets once, effectively 
sending twice the amount of trafﬁ c. Figure 
4 presents the system uplink performance 
when we vary both the number of overlay 
nodes that are under attack and the packet 
replication factor. For 200% packet replica-
tion we can sustain attacks up to 40% of 
the overlay nodes. Thus, our system has 
an operational threshold on the order of 
40% of the nodes being subverted. Before 
this 40% threshold is reached, the users 
will not notice a signiﬁ cant impact to 
their connectivity. As a comparison, in the 
original SOS architecture, the user had to 
ﬁ nd an overlay node that was not under 
attack, which becomes increasingly difﬁ -
cult as we increase the portion of nodes 
under attack. We quantify the increase in 
the system’s resistance to attacks using 
a simple analytical model and provide 
experimental validation by deploying a 
prototype over PlanetLab, a wide-area 
overlay network testbed. PlanetLab nodes 
are distributed across the Internet, serving 
as an ideal platform for experimentation.
Our analysis shows that an 
Akamai-sized ION with 2,500 nodes can 
withstand attacks that bring down up to 
40% of the overlay. This corresponds to 
attacks that involve several million bots 
(attacking hosts), which is an order of 
magnitude larger than the biggest bot 
network seen to date. One expects that 
using an ION will impose a performance 
penalty. In our case, end-to-end latency 
increases by a factor of 2.0 in the worst 
case, but, by using packet replication, 
we maintain latency at the same level as 
that of the direct-connection case. These 
results conﬁ rm the ﬁ ndings from other 
research on multi-path routing.
Finally, we evaluated the overhead 
of our system to the end-to-end latency 
experienced by the clients. Although 
latency increase is a big concern 
whenever we add a network indirection 
system, our experiments show that, in 
the worst-case scenario, we have a 2.5 
times increase in latency when compared 
to the direct connection to the protected 
server. However, this increase drops to 
just 1.5 times when we introduce a small 
packet replication of 50%. (For each two 
packets, we transmit another one.) In 
Figure 5, we present our latency results: 
As we increase the replication factor and 
for larger networks, we get better average 
latency results. In some cases, the latency 
observed when the client connects 
directly to the server can be higher than 
the one measured through the overlay. 
[The To (Overlay)/Td (Direct Connection) 
ratio in Figure 5 is below 1.0] This is true 
when some overlay nodes happen to have 
a lower latency route to the protected 
server when compared to the direct 
client-to-server route.
Conclusion
Our approach offers an attractive solution 
against congestion-based DDoS attacks in 
most environments, as it does not require 
modiﬁ cations to clients, servers, protocols, 
or routers, both in terms of hardware and 
Figure 4  Throughput results in KB/s when we use the 
uplink of our client under attack. The attack happens 
on a random fraction of the overlay nodes. Each line 
represents different packet replication levels: For 100% 
packet replication, the client sends twice the amount 
of traffic by replicating each packet. Allowing packet 
replication helps us achieve higher network resilience.
Figure 5  End-to-end average latency results for the 
index page and a collection of pages for http://www.
cnn.com. The different points denote the change in 
the end-to-end latency through the Overlay, To, when 
compared to the Direct Connection, Td. Different lines 
represent different-sized overlays. Increasing the 
replication factor and for larger networks, we get lower 
average latency results because of the multi-path ef-
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in existing software. Our plans for future 
work include developing a better charac-
terization of the trade-offs that we have 
explored so far by introducing a coding 
scheme for the data transmission that 
will adapt to the network characteristics 
of each path used. Furthermore, we are 
looking into mechanisms to protect our 
system against attackers that can take 
over overlay nodes, thereby subverting 
part of the infrastructure. Finally, we are 
interested in deploying and using such a 
protection system on a larger scale than 
our experimental testbed to acquire opera-
tional experience in a real environment. 
Our article, Countering DoS Attacks With 
Stateless Multipath Overlays, [10] contains 
additional details about our system and 
the analysis and experimental evaluation.■
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Letter to the Editor
I recently attended the 
Information Assurance Technical 
Framework Forum (IATFF) 
at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics 
Laboratory in Laurel, MD. While there, 
I heard a brieﬁ ng on the protection of 
data at rest and noted something: the 
Secure Mobile Environment-Portable 
Electronic Device. This is the ﬁ rst I’ve 
heard of this device. Might you know 
something more about it?
The Secure Mobile 
Environment-Portable Electronic 
Device (SME-PED) is the National 
Security Agency’s (NSA) concept for 
a secure, wireless, handheld product. 
Currently in development, the SME-PED 
will be a secure Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) and wireless phone. It will provide 
users with protected voice and data 
communications and support security 
levels up to the Top Secret level and email 
exchanges up to the Secret level.
The SME-PED will not only 
permit secure phone usage but will 
also be the first product to provide 
remote, wireless access to the Secret 
IP Router Network (SIPRNet). With 
NSA’s Type 1 and Non-Type 1 encryp-
tion implemented, individuals will be 
able to access the Internet, NIPRNet, 
and SIPRNet via the SME-PED.
Only two companies were awarded 
the $36M contract to develop this 
product, with a scheduled delivery date 
of 2Q 2007. Although the SME-PED’s 
release is scheduled almost a year from 
now, several government organizations 
have seen the value of this product and 
are already integrating the SME-PED in 
future plans and programs. For more 
information, please do not hesitate to 
contact us at iatac@dtic.mil. ■
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